The Recapture Of
Owerri By Biafran Forces
By the 14th of April, it had become obvious judging from
the situation on the ground, that Umuahia was going to be lost. It was also
clear that such an event would destroy completely the will of the Biafran
people to continue the war. It was then that Colonel Ojukwu told me of the need
to revive the Owerri operation on the off-chance that we might score a victory
there to counter-balance the loss of Umuahia. The idea was to share the few
resources available into two to try and clear what was left of Owerri before it
was too late. The whole idea was a calculated risk worth taking if the Head of
State who alone knew what ammunition the nation had, thought so.
On the 18th of April, therefore, the Owerri operations
were reopened. As I was still at Umuahia. I did not know exactly what was
available for the offensive. However, the plan of the operation which was sent
to me for approval, showed that the 60 Brigade was again to clear the right
side of the town up to the Clock Tower and including the Holy Ghose College,
the Catholic Cathedral and the Progress Hotel. The 52 Brigade, now under Major
Igweze, was to have another go at Orji and the northern part of the town, down
to the Public Works Department and the Government Secondary School. Elements of
"S" Division under command of 14 Division in the absence of
Onwuatuegwu, who was still at Umuahia, had the task of advancing through Egbu
and Nekede into Owerri, as far as to the motor park.
Right from the very start of this operation, it was clear
the enemy was beginning to feel the bite of his over four months of isolation
inside Owerri town. Everywhere his resistance was stiff but short-lived and
mainly sustained with armoured vehicles. From the four corners of Owerri, our
troops gradually closed in, and even began to set up roads block in parts of
Owerri. Yet in the part of the town the enemy occupied, it was still impossible
to break through the armour barrier. That was the situation when I returned to
Owerri front in the evening of the 23rd of April, 1969, following the fall of
Umuahia the previous day. The first report I got on my arrival was that the
enemy at Owerri had lined up all his vehicles facing southwards, in a manner
suggesting a withdrawal. After a very lengthy discussion of the situation with
the Division Commander, I decided it would be better to allow the enemy to
leave the town and then attack him somewhere out of Owerri, at a point where we
still stood a chance of destroying him. I thought that for us to put in
everything we had against the enemy inside the town could result in our
exhausting our limited resources without success, and then run a risk of losing
a large part of the town which we already controlled. For that reason, a
battalion of 60 Brigade was despatched to Umuguma to wait for the enemy. To
encourage the enemy to start the move we began to shell his convoy at a very
slow rate with the little quantity of bombs we had. During the month of March,
the enemy had on two occasions similarly lined up his vehicles to withdraw from
Owerri. On each of those occasions, we had attacked him and it had resulted in
his redeploying to defend himself and successfully too. This time we were not
going to attack him and therefore hoped that he would not change his mind.
During the night of the 24th of April, the enemy began to
move out of Owerri to the uncontrollable joy of all. Once out of town, a
Biafran company was put on their trail to harass them and hasten the
withdrawal. At Umuguma, the major battle began on the morning of the 25th and
the enemy suffered very heavy casualties indeed. Many vehicles carrying women,
children and enemy casualties were allowed to proceed on their journey
southwards unmolested. After 24 hours of heavy fighting the enemy shifted
further down to Avu, only to face another Biafran force waiting for them there.
After barely four hours encounter at Avu, the enemy moved again further south
to Ohoba and there linked up with his counterparts advancing from the south.
Thereafter all attempts to move him again failed, in the same way as did all
his attempts to move back from there into Owerri.
The Owerri victory revived the dying Biafra. All Biafrans
who a few days before wanted nothing but an end to the war, now pressed for a
continuation of the struggle to the end. The Umuahia disaster was soon
forgotten and the only quarrel civilian military tacticians had against the
Army was that they allowed the enemy to escape from Owerri instead of
destroying him there completely. Inside Owerri the enemy left a considerably
large amount of ammunition of different calibres, but he managed to take away
almost his entire heavy equipment including armoured vehicles and artillery
pieces. The town was completely ravaged and not a single building was habitable
without major repairs. All vehicles not taken away by the enemy were overturned
and burnt by him. Mass graves were discovered all over the town and the victims
appeared to be civilians and prisoners of war. All the same, the enemy force at
Owerri which was 14 Brigade under a young Calabar officer called Utuk, was
easily the best fighting unit fielded by Nigeria throughout the war. Right from
Port Harcourt, and particularly at Afam, it had become obvious that the Brigade
was a force well led. Inside Owerri, they fought with extraordinary courage,
flexibility and determination. The withdrawal of the Brigade from Owerri was
tactically tidy and well planned and executed. Without doubt no other Nigerian
Brigade could have withstood for more than a month the punishment the enemy 14
Brigade absorbed with patience for over four months. Only that Brigade could
have got out of Owerri under the circumstances.
The Head of State put out a long list of promotions to
commemorate the recapture of Owerri. He himself became a General while
Okwechime, Eze and Kalu were all promoted to Brigadiers. Various others were
promoted except Onwuatuegwu, the darling of the people, who has left out of
General Ojukwu's list. That omission became a national political issue.
"Jet 77," the government sponsored propaganda company of
Onwuatuegwu’s "S" Division,
accused the Army Headquarters of not promoting Onwuatuegwu because it hated
him. The “Jet 77” produced hand-outs for the public in which they revealed that
the “S” Division under Onwuatuegwu had cleared the Ugba junction and Owerri
and, no each occasion, the gallant Onwuatuegwu got nothing in return but
humiliation from the GOC of the Army.
I was not worried by this propaganda which I knew was
just one of those false rumours deliberately released against various
individuals from time to time in order to control their popularity with the
masses. I often disagreed with Onwuatuegwu in the same way I disagreed
occasionally with all other commanders under me. To talk of an Army Commander
in war loving or hating officers under his command is being childish in the
extreme. In such a game involving human lives, a commander's aim is to end it
successfully as soon as possible. Onwuatuegwu, as an individual, being the
godfather of my first son and the officer closest to my family, knew I was
putting the welfare of the people before family ties and friendship.
After the fall of Umuahia and the recapture of Owerri,
General Ojukwu in May, 1969, took two significant decisions for reasons best
known to him. Thereafter I was allowed to see the Head of State on military
matters at any time of the day or night without booking for appointment in
advance - a privilege I had not enjoyed before then. Again, the Head of State
decided to set up a Joint Planning Committee chairmanned by himself, with the
Chief of Staff, General Efiong, and the Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force
as members. In addition, I was given the privilege of controlling for the first
time, a small fraction of the national ammunition holding, but the bulk of it
still remained under the control of the Head of State.
All those privileges and changes were in effect an eye
wash, designed to satisfy civilian and military pressures, which had existed
since the beginning of the war, in favour of the establishment of a war
council. Civilians now had the impression that not only did we do joint
planning, but also that the Army Commander controlled all ammunition. The Joint
Planning Committee met once a week from May, 1969 to the end of the war but not
one of the 14 operational plans which it produced was ever carried out. The
committee planned all the time without knowing what was available; and
invariably at the end of each plan it discovered that there were no resources
for such a plan which would then be discarded and a new plan produced. The
Planning Committee under Brigadier Okwechime worked like that until the end of
the war. However, we looked forward to JPC meetings because they were held in
the State House, one of the very few places in Biafra where one could get a
glass of cold beer.
Excerpts from The Nigeria Revolution and the
Biafra War by Alexandra A. Madiebo
Published by:
Chibuike John Nebeokike
For: IPOB
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