Biafran Army
Offensive To Clear Owerri
Our minor successes on the Owerri front since the
clearance of Oguta and Egbema oil fields, had been encouraging enough to tempt
me into doing something better organised on a larger scale. In addition to
pushing the enemy back all the way from Inyiogugu to Amafor on the left flank
of Owerri, we had also, on the right, pushed him further south from Egbema to
Ebocha bridge. As a result of these successful flank operations, the enemy
inside Owerri thinned out quite considerably to protect those flanks. Having
taken these facts into consideration, I decided to start an operation to clear
Owerri town.
At this time our troops around Owerri included the 60
Brigade under Colonel Asoya, which, with a strength of about 1000 armed men,
had the responsibility of defending the whole area between Owerri-Ihiala road
and Owerri-Port Harcourt road. There was the 52 Brigade roughly of the same
strength, under Colonel Chris Ugokwe, whose responsibility it was to defend
from Owerri-Ihiala to Owerri-Umuahia road. The Third Brigade of the 14
Division, the 63 Brigade under the command of Colonel Lambert Ihenacho,
protected the entire Division left flank stretching from Owerri-Umuahia road
down to the Imo River. In addition, the "S” Division sent up a battalion
reinforcement which was concentrated in Emekuku near Owerri, for the proposed
offensive. This battalion, called the 68 Battalion, was under the command of
Major Ikeji and was to operate independently but in support of the 14 Division.
With the forces available and our limited resources, I did not expect to
immediately drive the enemy out of Owerri. I however realised that if we could
prevent him from getting reinforcements and supplies, we could in our own time,
wear him down gradually until he lost the will to fight. The overall plan for
dealing with Owerri was therefore geared towards achieving that aim.
The task of surrounding Owerri and gradually destroying
the enemy inside it was going to be a gigantic one, and would take a very long
time, considering the fact that ammunition supply to the troops was normally
small and most irregular. For that reason, the whole operation was divided into
three major phases. The aim of the first phase was to box in the enemy on all
sides as much as possible into Owerri town, and sever all his routes to the
rear except for the Owerri-Port Harcourt main road. It was necessary to leave
that major line of communication open for the enemy, otherwise we would scare
him too soon, and compel him to take necessary precautions before we were fully
prepared to deal the final blow. For that phase, 52 Brigade was to push enemy
back in all its areas of responsibility to within one mile from Owerri. Its
special tasks during that phase were to clear Egbu, Orji and Orogwe. 60 Brigade
was to clear all areas right of Port Harcourt-Owerri road and then maintain a
strong defensive line all along the side of that road from Irete on their left
to UMuakpu on their right. In addition, the Brigade was to deny the enemy the
use of Elele-Umudiogu-Ubimi road, thereafter. The 68 Battalion of "S"
Division had the task of moving through the left flank of 63 Brigade to clear
all areas held by the enemy on the left side of Port Harcourt-Owerri road
between Naze and Umuakpu. The 63 Brigade was to remain in its defensive
positions but prepared to provide reinforcements for places where they were
needed for exploiting success.
On the successful completion of the first phase, we
expected to see the enemy concentrate heavily inside Owerri town, and
thereafter having as his only link to the rear the main Port Harcourt road. On
our side, we expected to find our troops who were widely dispersed in defensive
locations, better concentrated and in a position to operate more effectively.
If and when that happened, it would then be the signal for the beginning of the
second phase of the operation.
In the second phase, the sole aim was to move swiftly in
strength with all that was available and seize the Port Harcourt road between
Avu and Umuakpu, and thus seal off Owerri. During that phase 60 Brigade was to
move to take Obinze and Avu and link up both towns and exploit southwards to
Mgbirichi where they would join up with 68 Battalion elements. The 68 Battalion
itself was expected to seize the thinly defended towns of Umuakpu and Umuagwo
and, having linked them up, was to move northwards to Mgbirichi to make contact
with 60 Brigade. It was clearly obvious that if the second phase was successful
the reaction of the enemy inside Owerri would be very violent indeed. For that
reason, the task of 52 Brigade during that phase was merely to prepare troops
to beat back enemy counterattacks both in 60 Brigade and 68 Battalion areas
The third and final phase of the operation was descend on
encircled enemy inside Owerri and destroy him while preventing him from
breaking through southwards. For the final phase, the 60 Brigade was to clear
the right half of the town up to the clock tower, the 52 Brigade was to tackle
the left side of the town while the 68 Battalion was to defend the Port Harcourt-Owerri
road and flanks right and left of it.
It was a very ambitious plan based entirely on optimism,
for its success depended mainly on the amount of material and administrative
support that would be made available. With the scarcity of food, troops were
expected to harvest wild cassava, yams and vegetables and augment the Food
Directorate supplies. It was in their interest that they did all they could to
clear their objectives if for no other reason, but to be able to harvest
abandoned crops in enemy held areas. On the issue of ammunition, which was what
mattered most, the Head of State promised and later issued the following
ammunition to all troops taking part for the first one week of the operation —
50,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 200 rounds of 105 mm artillery shells,
300 rounds of mortar bombs, 20 rounds of anti-tank rockets, grenades and other
smaller items. 14 Division Commander Kalu, wanted the whole ammunition for a
period of one week issued to him in bulk to ensure that his operations were not
interrupted by frequent ammunition shortages. Ojukwu turned the request down
and preferred to issue on daily basis to ensure that the week’s quota was not
exhausted in less than a week. Ojukwu later told me that he did not even have
that amount of ammunition, but had based his allocations on what he expected to
receive every night during the week of the operation.
On the 3rd of December, the 63 Brigade launched a
two-pronged limited offensive against Elelem and Eziama as a part of a
diversionary plan to occupy enemy’s attention. The main Owerri offensive
started in earnest in all sectors at 0700 hours, 5 December, 1978. 60 Brigade
moved with a battalion each on three fronts. On the left, a battalion moved to
clear Izombe and Obudi. From there, while a part of it moved to clear Ogbaku on
the Ihiala road, the rest of the battalion moved to Ofogwe. From the centre,
another battalion moved from the area of Okwuzu and Mgbede and took Obigwe and,
shortly after, were in full control of Okuku. This particular move was so swift
that the enemy Battalion Headquarters at Obudi did not realise for some time
that it had been cut off together with most of the battalion sub-units. Thus,
many enemy soldiers and vehicles which were either moving to Obudi or returning
from there fell into our hands in the area of Okuku. The third battalion of 60
Brigade moving on both Ohoba-Umukanne road and Asa-Awarra road, took Umuakpu
quite easily. Thus, in the first three days, the 60 Brigade had completed their
tasks in the first phase, resulting in the clearing of several hundreds of
square miles enemy occupied territory.
68 Battalion was equally successful in clearing all enemy
held areas left of the Port Harcourt road down to Mgbirichi, thus establishing
a permanent link with the 63 Brigade. The 68 Battalion success left us
completely in control of all areas southeast of Owerri town down to Owerrinta
bridge to a depth of about ten miles from the Aba-Owerri road. The 52 Brigade
facing the enemy forward concentrations made only small gains as expected. Once
or twice, they cleared Orji but lost it again. At the end of one week, the
first phase was considered to be over and the results, particularly in 60
Brigade area were very encouraging.
A considerably large quantity of arms and ammunition was
captured, even though most of the weapons were damaged and the bulk of the
ammunition was of a calibre useless to us. Because of the rapidly decreasing
quantity of ammunition available to us for the operation, I decided to execute
the second phase with only one brigade fighting at a time, and as soon as its
objectives were completely attained, the next brigade or formation would start.
For that reason, the 60 Brigade started off by clearing Avu and Obinze while
other formations remained in defence. Both towns fell and were linked up but by
the end of the day we had lost them again following an enemy armoured assault
on both towns from Owerri. For a couple of days, we put in a series of attacks
on both towns but the enemy invariably managed to push us out despite his loss
of an armoured personnel carrier, a ferret armoured car and many men during
these battles.
The enemy in Owerri had very good reasons to be desperate
because the International Team, which observed atrocities, was trapped inside
Owerri town and had to be got out if they were to continue "observing.”
After about seven days of unsuccessful operations against Avu and Obinze. I
became quite sure that we would not succeed in sealing off Owerri from that
area. Avu was too close to the enemy concentration in Owerri and therefore attracted
a swift and immediate counterattack from him any time the town was threatened.
It therefore became necessary to look for a point along the Port Harcourt road
which would be far enough from Owerri to discourage the enemy from journeying
all the way from Owerri to counterattack. Even if he did that, it would be
after we should have had enough time to dig in properly to resist his attack
more effectively. In that case, he would be overstretching himself. In a
modified plan for phase two, the 60 Brigade therefore moved further down to
attack and capture Umuagwo and Umuakpu from Umukanne on their right, while 68
Battalion was to attack Obinze.
The operation started on the 6th of January with
immediate tremendous success. The enemy at Umuakpu and Umuagwo was quickly
rounded up and destroyed and his stores and equipment captured. The going was
so easy for us at Umuakpu that our force that took it moved further down and
also took Omanelu, thus threatening Elele 35 miles south of Owerri. Due to
difficult terrain, the 68 Battalion was rather slow moving up to Obinze but
later, with the assistance of our troops who had moved northwards from Umuagwo
through Mgbirichi, Obinze was also taken. Throughout the battle there was very
little reaction from the enemy inside Owerri except when we tried to move from
Obinze to Avu. Then he grew very violent and we went back to Obinze.
By the end of the day we were controlling over 20 miles
of the road which was before then the last link between Owerri and Port
Harcourt, thereby having the enemy brigade at Owerri completely
surrounded. In order to ensure that the
enemy on both sides of the corridor did not link up ever again, we used several
hundreds of civilians to render that stretch of road absolutely impassable
using mines, ditches and heavy trees felled across the road. Thereafter, the 68
Battalion which had grown gradually and been renamed the 68 Brigade, took
charge of the defence of the Port Harcourt road (inclusive) westwards to 63
Brigade, while the 60 Brigade
defended eastwards to Orashi River.
From the 8th of January, 1969, the enemy began his
counterattacks to reopen the road. These attacks, which came from the Port
Harcourt end, persisted for several months unsuccessfully until we cleared
Owerri town itself.
For the success of the third and final phase, which was
to clear Owerri town, our greatest hope lay not so much on our strength as on
the happy thought that if we attacked the enemy in Owerri with determination
for long, he would run out of ammunition and give up further resistance. For
that reason, the prevention of the enemy from breaking through into or out of
Owerri was even more important at that stage than trying to clear the town in a
hurry. The troops taking part were now getting increasingly tired despite their
high morale, due to the steadily deteriorating state of supply and
administrative backing generally. Sickness in the war front was on the increase
as a result of hunger and exposure, but we had no other alternative but to
continue with the operation to the end.
On the 15th of January, therefore, the final phase began.
60 Brigade moved to clear the Holy Ghost College, the Cathedral and the
Progress Hotel. On the successful completion of those tasks the Brigade was
expected to wheel right and mop up the enemy up to the Clock Tower, and the
neighbouring Motor Park. The minimum the Brigade was expected to achieve was at
least to get to the small bridge on the Otamini River adjacent to the Holy
Ghost College and blow it up. That achievement would prevent the enemy from
using his vehicles beyond the centre of the town in any attempt by him to move
southwards.
As soon as we struck, the enemy in the Holy Ghost College
and the Cathedral fled into Owerri town centre, abandoning large quantities of
ammunition, food and clothing. Instead of keeping up with the chase down to the
Oramini bridge and from there into the town, Biafran troops, hungry and naked,
halted to eat and evacuate enemy abandoned food, and also to change into the
newly captured uniforms. In the confusion and excitement thus created, it was
virtually impossible to retain control of the men to enable us to push on,
despite desperate efforts in this direction by all senior commanders. While
this confusion persisted, the enemy quickly counter attacked, and took good
advantage of the confused and disorganised state of Biafra troops to dislodge
us from the captured grounds. We were soon back in our trenches after having
lost gained grounds.
For the next one month, we launched several attacks a week,
still hoping that the enemy there would eventually run out of ammunition. In
the meantime, from the direction of Port Harcourt, enemy daily attempts to
break through to Owerri had developed into a major brigade operation. From
Elele, the enemy was pushing northwards desperately for several weeks on both
Omanelu-Umuakpu and Elele-Ubimini-Awarra roads. We fought him back with equal
determination, but he was still gaining ground slowly but steadily. By the end
of March, the enemy was at Umuakpu on the main axis and at Asa on the right
flank. That was a considerably alarming situation for us because Asa was less
than 20 miles from Owerri.
Meanwhile, inside Owerri, the enemy was clearly in
trouble after over two months of complete isolation within the town. All
wireless intercepts confirmed that fact. Reconnaissance reports also showed
that the enemy was so short of food that he was compelled to kill most of his
Biafran prisoners of war and civilian detainees inside Owerri because there was
not sufficient food with which to feed them. After two months of daily promises
of a link-up by Port Harcourt had failed, the enemy resorted to air dropping
ammunition and food. What was left under enemy control in Owerri was so small
that most of what was dropped fell into Biafran hands.
Any Biafran unit around Owerri which wanted something
dropped for it by the enemy, only needed to clear a bit of bush, spread a white
sheet of cloth over the clearing, and he would get a drop. Unfortunately, due
to gross inefficiency of the enemy air-drop operations, the very large quantity
of ammunition we acquired through it was almost all damaged and therefore
useless to the Army. Gun powder was however laboriously extracted from the
damaged ammunition for use by the BOFF and other civil defence organisations.
As a result of enemy air drops, the 14 Division was for some time fairly well
fed and thus became fitter for its operations.
On the 15th of March, following a detailed review of the
Owerri operations, during which much consideration was given to the pathetic
and desperate state of the enemy in Owerri, Colonel Ojukwu and I decided to put
in a last spirited effort to clear the town. Fresh supplies were said to have
come into Biafra a few days before by air and Colonel Ojukwu was willing to
make generous grants in support of the effort. Besides issuing ammunition, he
made available 960 bolt action rifles. These weapons he said, would be used to
reinforce the “S” Division so as to enable them to move two more battalions’
and the Division Headquarters from Aba to Owerri for the operation. It was
hoped that, in the long run, the whole of “S” Division wherever they were,
would concentrate in Owerri. In discussing a possible plan for the operations
with the Head of State, I wanted the “S” Division to move to the area of 68
Brigade and from there, attack the enemy in strength from the rear. My argument
was that the enemy was weakest there, and would be caught unaware if we
attacked for a change from his rear as opposed to the usual frontal or flanking
attacks.
The Head of State on the other hand wanted all available
forces concentrated at Emekuku, and from there they would attempt to “smash”
through the main road into Owerri to capture it. It was quite clear to me after
15 months of hard fighting experience that we stood very little chance of
success if we attacked frontally because we lacked the punch necessary to break
through Nigeria Army defences frontally. In the end, however, Ojukwu’s plan was
adopted.
The “S” Division troops under Colonel Onwuatuegwu,
initiated the move and after several days of daily encounters, we failed to
move the enemy while, at the same time, the ammunition available for the
operation was running out rapidly. I was neither satisfied with the efforts of
the Division as a whole, nor with the effectiveness of the Division Commander.
He was often absent from his Division operational area during operations and,
as a result, his troops lacked effective leadership and never kept to any
timings. Worse still no detailed military instructions could be passed to his
Division Headquarters in his absence because most of his staff were civilians
with no military training or, at best, the usual four weeks training at the
Biafran School of Infantry. For reasons best known to him, he seemed to prefer
it that way.
With such a bad situation, Achuzia, who was often eager
to prove his fighting ability, sought directly and obtained Ojukwu's permission
to take over a part of “S” Division and clear Owerri with it. Onwuatuegwu did
not like that arrangement but had to obey the order. When Achuzia arrived,
Onwuatuegwu reluctantly gave him his “S” Brigade under Major Atumaka but
refused thereafter to co-operate with or render any further assistance to him.
In less than 24 hours, Achuzia had broken through and cleared Egbu town and
advanced to within a mile of Owerri town centre.
Achuzia's success was achieved with heavy casualties on
our men. Thus, when Achuzia wanted the rest of the Division placed under him so
as to continue the offensive, the two officers began to quarrel to the extent
of drawing pistols against each other. Even though all this happened in my
presence, I had to take the two officers to Umuahia to see Ojukwu under whose
direct command they were placed for the operation.
Ojukwu ruled that Achuzie should take command of the
entire "S" Division for a week's intensive operations while
Onwuatuegwu took a rest. All subsequent operations by Achuzia did not succeed
and resulted in very high casualties on our side including the "S"
Brigade Commander, Major Atumaka. The Head of State therefore called off the
operation, withdrew his material and administrative support, restored
Onwuatuegwu to his command, and asked me to start all over again, this time
using my own plan. Other major battles developing elsewhere made that
impossible for some time.
Excerpts from The Nigeria Revolution and the
Biafra War by Alexandra A. Madiebo
Published by:
Chibuike John Nebeokike
For: IPOB
